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Abstract 
This study estimates the fiscal cost of refugee immigration. This is done by calculating the 
total value of economic resources that are redistributed through the public sector in Sweden in 
2007 to the population of immigrants who once arrived in the country as refugees or their 
family members. The total redistribution corresponds to 1.0% of Swedish GDP in the same 
year. Four-fifths of it is due to lower public per-capita revenues from refugees compared with 
the total population, and one-fifth is due to higher per-capita public costs associated with 
refugees. 
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1 – Introduction  
The world currently has more refugees and internally displaced persons than it has ever had 
since the Second World War: more than 50 million people.
1
 Yet wealthy – particularly 
European – countries’ readiness to provide asylum to these refugees appears to be waning, 
and increasingly uneven. In 2013, Sweden and Germany alone accounted for 40% of all 
positive first-instance decisions on asylum claims in the entire European Union. Sweden 
alone, which hosts less than 2% of the total population in the EU, accounted for a full 22%.
2
 
These large differences in refugee admittance mirror correspondingly large differences in 
attitudes to immigration across Europe. In the 2012 wave of the European Social Survey, a 
full 21% of respondents stated the opinion that their country ought to allow no immigration at 
all from poorer countries outside Europe. Yet among respondents from Sweden or Germany, 
the share was merely 4% (own calculations).  
Concerns about the negative impact on welfare sectors are likely to be a major reason why 
people and politicians across Europe oppose the idea of increasing their refugee intakes. 
Several studies (e.g. Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 
2007; Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012) have confirmed the importance of such concerns 
in shaping public opposition to immigration in general. And in the case of opposition to 
refugee immigration there are good reasons to expect them to be even more salient, since 
refugees generally have lower employment rates and higher benefit take-up rates compared 
with other immigrants. 
If all of the EU15 (i.e. the pre-2004 EU members) would have had the same refugee 
immigration per capita as Sweden in 2005-2014, total refugee immigration in these fifteen 
countries would have been 5.9 million instead of the factual 740,000. The difference between 
these two numbers corresponds to almost one-third of the global stock of refugees residing 
outside their own country and in need of protection (16.7 million in 2013, according to 
UNHCR). Hence under the hypothesis that large public costs associated with refugee 
immigration are a major reason why refugee intakes are not higher, it is of primary 
importance to have a good estimate of how high these costs actually are. However no such 
estimate exists in the literature. A fairly large number of studies estimate the amounts that are 
redistributed through the public sectors in various OECD countries between natives and 
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 Data source: International Displacement Monitoring Centre: http://www.internal-displacement.org, accessed 11 
February, 2015 
2
 Data source: Eurostat, accessed 11 February, 2015 
immigrants in general. Rowthorn’s (2008) influential survey of this literature concludes that 
most estimates are in the interval between +1% and –1% of GDP being redistributed from 
natives to immigrants annually.  
However these estimates refer to countries’ total immigrant stocks, i.e. to different 
combinations of labor, family, and refugee immigrants. Yet is quite evident that the net fiscal 
contribution of the average refugee immigrant must be lower than that of the average labor 
immigrant. Supporting this view, Ekberg (2009) summarizes Swedish studies since the 1970s 
and concludes that the average immigrant in Sweden was a net fiscal contributor during the 
period until around the mid-1980s, i.e. a period when the immigrant stock was strongly 
dominated by labor immigrants. Yet since then, refugees have come to make up larger shares 
of the total immigrant stock and immigrants’ net fiscal contributions have consequently been 
negative. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) also conclude that European immigrants in the UK 
are net fiscal contributors on average. Yet they find that non-European immigrants – where 
refugees make up a more important share of the total stock – on average receive more from 
the public sector than they put in. 
Yet beyond these indications, there exists no estimate of the fiscal redistribution explicitly to 
refugee immigrants in any Western country. This task is therefore undertaken in the present 
study. The empirical strategy is the same as in the literature on fiscal redistribution to/from 
immigrations in general (this strategy is discussed by Rowthorn, 2008, and Preston, 2014). 
We consider the case of Sweden, which appears to consistently have had Europe’s largest 
refugee immigration per capita since the early 1980s,
3
 and also has a comparatively large 
welfare sector. We use micro data to identify refugees’ individual tax payments and welfare 
transfers, and to estimate age related public spending such as on schooling and care. One 
important challenge in this exercise is that refugee immigrants are not explicitly identified in 
the data. Yet using the available information on year of immigration and country of birth, we 
can identify a large sample of individuals with very high probabilities of being refugees.  
The data is from 2007, which was the last year before Statistics Sweden enacted a policy of 
only providing researchers with less detailed information on individual country of birth in 
their micro data sets. It was also the year after a particularly large inflow of refugees from 
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 This statement is true since 2004 according to Eurostat data on refugee immigration. Before 2004, there is no 
comparable data on actual refugee immigration. Yet in UNHCR data on the size of refugee populations by 
country of asylum, Sweden appears to host the highest number of refugees per capita in Europe in each year 
1983-2003. 
Iraq. The total stock of immigrants who once arrived as refugees (not counting those who 
arrived during 2007) is estimated to have made up 5.1% of the total Swedish population in 
2007. We estimate that the fiscal redistribution to this population from the remaining 94.9% if 
the Swedish population amounted to 1.0% of GDP in 2007. Since then, the Swedish refugee 
stock has kept increasing, and by the end of 2014 it made up approximately 7.0% of the 
Swedish population. Scaling up the redistribution in 2007 by this increase in the refugee 
population, we estimate that the corresponding redistribution in 2015 is likely to be around 
1.35% of GDP. 
Section 2 describes the data set that was used in this study, and the process of identifying 
refugees in the data. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics on the refugee population. 
Section 4 describes in detail how the fiscal redistribution to the refugee population was 
calculated, and the result of this calculation. The findings are discussed in Section 5. 
2 – Data  
We use micro data from the LINDA database 2007, which is provided by Statistics Sweden. 
This database contains information from Swedish public registers on e.g. individual income, 
tax payments, and welfare receipts, as well as on characteristics such as gender, age, 
education, country of birth, and year of immigration (for immigrants). The database consists 
of a random sample of 3% of the total Swedish population, plus an additional random sample 
of 20% of the total immigrant population. Hence merging these two we obtain a random 
sample of approximately 22.4% of the total immigrant population. 
2.1 – Identification of refugees 
The data does not contain information on whether an immigrant is a refugee or not. Hence a 
fundamental task in this study is to obtain a sample of individuals that provides a good 
representation of the refugee population in Sweden. To this end we sample individuals who 
arrived from certain countries during certain periods, where – based on historical accounts – 
we can be certain that as good as all individuals are in fact refugees or their family members. 
In doing this, it is important to strike the right balance between including as many refugees as 
possible, and including as few non-refugees as possible. Primary importance is given to the 
latter objective. It is most important to ensure that the contamination of non-refugees in the 
sample is as small as possible, also at the expense of excluding more actual refugees. 
The sampled countries and years of immigration are listed in the first two columns of Table 1. 
Notably, the list includes some countries (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone) that have in fact sent 
only small numbers of refugees to Sweden, whereas it excludes other countries that have sent 
substantially larger numbers (e.e. Poland, Turkey). This is for the purpose of not sampling 
non-refugees. There was significant labor immigration from these countries also during the 
periods when there was large refugee immigration. 
The obtained refugee sample contains 79,724 individuals. Their distribution across countries 
of origin in the sample is shown in the third column of Table 1. We see that the most 
important origins are Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran, which together make up more than 
70% of the sample. As a check on how well we have managed to exclude non-refugees, we 
may compare the sample’s distribution across countries of the origin with the corresponding 
distribution of all asylum requests ever approved in Sweden. This comparison should be 
relevant, since refugees in general have low remigration rates (Klinthäll, 2007). Hence the 
distribution of refugees that are present in 2007 should be a good representation of all 
refugees who ever immigrated. And if a country of origin’s share of all immigrants present in 
2007 is substantially larger than its share of all asylum grants ever given, this would indicate 
that the sample of immigrants from that country also contains a substantial share of non-
refugees and that it is appropriate to delete immigrants from this country from the refugee 
sample. 
There is aggregated data in official Swedish records on the distribution of all asylum grants 
given across years and countries of origin, yet only from 1980. Hence the fourth column 
shows the distribution of the sampled individuals who immigrated 1980 or later. Since only 
few refugees immigrated before 1980, the difference from the previous column is small. The 
largest difference is for Hungary, from which there was substantial refugee immigration 
already in the late 1950s. The fourth column is then to be compared with the fifth, which 
shows the distribution across countries of origin of all Swedish asylum grants that were given 
in the corresponding period to applicants from any of the relevant combinations of years and 
countries of origin (hence also this column sums to 100%). We see that the distributions of 
these two columns are indeed highly similar. The largest difference is for former Yugoslavia, 
where the share in the 2007 sample is significantly smaller than the share of all asylums 
granted. This is consistent with the comparatively high repatriation rates observed for 
refugees originating from former Yugoslavia (UNHCR, 2005).  
The country of origin that is more clearly over-represented in the 2007 sample compared with 
in the asylum grants data is Lebanon, which represents 3.7% of the 2007 sample yet only 
2.3% of the asylum grants. It might have been more appropriate to delete immigrants of 
Lebanese origin based on this. Yet doing so or not does not have any noticeable impact on the 
results of this study.
4
 
We also need to estimate the size of the total refugee population in Sweden in 2007. Our 
sample of 79,724 individuals is a random sample of 22.4% of a total population which is then 
approximately 350,000 individuals. The combinations of years and countries of origin that are 
included in our sample represents 75% of all asylum grants that were given in Sweden 1980-
2006. Assuming that we have captured a similar share also of all refugees who arrived prior to 
1980, our best estimate of the total refugee population in Sweden in 2007 is 350,000 / 0.75 = 
470,000 individuals. This number is equal to 5.1% of the total Swedish population in that 
year. 
3 – Characteristics of the refugee population 
Descriptive statistics on the refugee population and the total Swedish population in 2007 are 
shown in Table 2. We see that males are slightly overrepresented among refugees; they make 
up 52.3% of the refugee sample. We also see that the refugee sample is more concentrated in 
the middle age groups between twenty and sixty years of age, compared with the total 
population. Turning to years since immigration, we see that there is a peak in the 10-14 years 
since immigration interval. This is due to the large refugee inflow associated with the war in 
Bosnia. 
Education levels are reported for individuals aged 25-64. There are a few missing 
observations: 3.5% for refugees and 1.9% for the total population. The main difference 
between the two columns is that the share that has not completed lower secondary education 
(9-10 years of education) is more than twice as high among refugees: 13.8% compared with 
5.3% in the total population.  
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 By comparison, we did not include any immigrants from Turkey in the refugee sample, although 5,000 asylums 
were given to people from Turkey in 1980-1994. If we would include immigrants who arrived from Turkey 
during this period in the 2007 sample, they would make up 4.4% of that sample, while they would only make up 
2.0% of all asylum grants. Hence in this case the over-representation would have been 2.4 percentage points, 
compared with 1.4 for immigrants from Lebanon. There is also a contextual difference between these two 
countries. Lebanese refugees were generated by a civil war that affected the whole country. Turkish refugees 
were more selectively generated; to a large extent they belonged to discriminated ethnic minorities (Kurds, 
Assyrians).  
3.1 – Economic status of refugees 
The last rows of Table 2 show statistics on the economic status of the refugee population aged 
18-64, compared with the total population in the same age interval. Here we see strikingly 
large differences. The first row reports average non-capital income (mainly salary income, 
small business income, and pensions). We see that the average income level of refugees is 
merely 60% of that in the total population. The second row reports the share of each sample 
that earns on average more than 9,000 kronor per month over the whole year. We use this 
level as a measure of employment, since it is below approximately this level that a one-person 
household may be entitled to social assistance.
5
 We see that the share earning an income at 
least this high is more than twenty percentage points lower in the refugee population 
compared with in the total population. One may suspect that this may be partly due to lower 
female labor force participation among refugees. Yet the next row shows that this is not the 
case to any large extent. When comparing the shares above the same threshold among males 
only, the difference between the two groups becomes only a few percentage points smaller. 
Correspondingly, on the final row we see a substantially larger share receiving social 
assistance among refugees than in the total population: 17.0% among refugees and 3.3% in 
the total population.
6
 How this share varies with time spent in Sweden for refugees is shown 
in Figure 1. In the year after immigration, slightly more than half of the refugee population 
aged 18-64 receives social assistance. Subsequently, the value drops steadily over time, yet 
never fully as low as the corresponding share in the total population. 
In column (1) of Table 3 we analyze the variation in social assistance receipts among refugees 
further by reporting these shares separately by refugees’ countries/regions of origin. We see 
strikingly large differences between major regions, ranging from 3.2% of those from Eastern 
Europe receiving social assistance to 40.2% of those from Somalia.  
A major reason behind these differences is that some immigrant groups are more recently 
arrived and have had less time than others to integrate into the labor market. To control for 
this, we regress a binary variable that indicates whether an individual receives social 
assistance or not on the full set of dummies for age and years since migration intervals that 
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 No exact threshold is defined. Yet according to guidelines from the Swedish board of Health and Welfare, a 
one-person household should have approximately 3,470 kronor per month at its disposal after paying income 
taxes and rent (which is allowed to cost approximately 3,000 kronor per month outside the larger cities). 
6
 Notably, “social assistance” includes the introductory assistance that is received specifically by refugees for up 
to their first two years in Sweden. 
was reported in Table 2, plus one dummy for each of the regions listed in Table 3. The 
resulting coefficients on the regional dummies are reported in column (2) of Table 3, with 
Eastern Europe being the omitted category. We see that controlling for age and years since 
migration significantly reduces the differences between regions of origin, yet also that large 
differences still remain: the min-max range decreases from 37.0 to 25.0 percentage points. 
Going one step further, column (3) reports the resulting coefficients on the regional dummies 
when we also include the education dummies that were listed in Table 2 in the regression. 
This further reduces the differences between origins, yet this time the reduction is smaller. 
4 – The redistribution of resources to refugees through the public sector 
The results reported in the previous section showed that refugees earn substantially lower 
income levels and receive substantially more social assistance compared with the total 
population. This indicates that the redistribution of economic resources through the public 
sector from the rest of the population to the refugees is likely to be substantial. This section is 
devoted to the main task of the present study, namely to estimate the magnitude of this 
redistribution. 
In theory almost all of the public sector’s revenues and also the majority of its costs can be 
attributed to specific individuals, although there are limitations to doing this in practice. A 
summary of Swedish public revenues and costs in 2007 is provided in column (1) of Table 4. 
We will now explain in detail how we calculate refugees’ contributions to each of the revenue 
and cost items in the table. 
4.1 – Estimating refugees’ contributions to public revenues and costs  
Public revenues 
Direct taxes, individuals: Direct taxes paid by individuals include labor and capital income 
taxes, and property taxes. These make up slightly more than one-third of Swedish public 
revenues in 2007. Individual tax payments are obtained from the LINDA database. 
Payroll taxes: Payroll taxes are taxes paid by the employer as a function of the employee’s 
wage. In 2007 the basic payroll tax rate was 32.42%. Yet a number of different deductions 
applied, which cannot be traced to specific individuals using the available data. Therefore, a 
common payroll tax rate is applied to the wage earnings of all individuals in LINDA. This 
rate is calculated so that total estimated payments should match total reported payroll tax 
revenues (Swedish Government, 2007).  
Consumption taxes: Consumption taxes include VAT, alcohol and carbon taxes, etc. They 
are in effect paid by specific individuals when these buy consumer goods. Yet there is no way 
for us to trace them back to these individuals. Instead we estimate individual consumption 
taxes by using aggregate data provided by Statistics Sweden on the relation between 
household income and consumption in 2007. Hence we may estimate each individual’s share 
in total consumption and thus in total consumption taxes paid. Yet we do not know the 
consumption tax rate on the average krona spent, since different goods have different rates. 
Instead we calculate an effective average consumption tax rate that makes estimated total 
payments equal to the total consumption tax revenues reported by the Swedish Government 
(2007).  
Direct taxes, corporations: About 7% of public revenues are made up of taxes paid by 
corporations. In principle these revenues could be traced to individuals if we had information 
on the ownership of these corporations, although this exercise would be complicated by 
foreign ownership. Yet it is fair to assume that refugees’ ownership of larger corporations in 
Sweden is very small. Hence we make the simple – although quite strong – assumption that it 
is in fact zero. 
Other revenues: Slightly less than 3% of public revenues are not covered by the four major 
categories listed above. These revenues are assumed to be distributed equally across the entire 
population; hence refugees’ share of these is set equal to their share of the total population. 
Public costs 
Transfers to individuals: Public transfers to individuals amount to one-third of public sector 
spending. Individual receipts are reported in the LINDA database. By far the single largest 
item is public pensions, which make up more than half of the total transfer value. Other items 
include, among others, unemployment support, parental leave support, and early retirement. 
The most important differences in average transfers received between the total population and 
the refugee population are on pensions and social assistance. Hence these are the only two 
transfer categories that are listed separately in Table 4, whereas all others are grouped 
together in the “Other individual transfers” category. 
Hospital and elderly care: Hospital and elderly care is always given to specific individuals. 
Yet there is no public data where these individuals can be traced. However there is a strong 
relationship between a person’s age and their average care needs. Hence we use information 
from Borgquist et al. (2010) on average hospital costs by age interval, and information from 
the Social Board of Health and Welfare (2008) on average elderly care costs by age interval. 
For refugees we multiply hospital care costs by a factor 1.3. This reflects the finding of 
Wallin and Carlberg (2000) that – controlling for age – individuals that were born outside 
Europe (i.e. predominantly refugees) visit doctors or nurses about 1.3 times as often as other 
individuals in Sweden.  
Disability care: As for hospital and elderly care, disability care is given to specific 
individuals. Yet in this case we have better possibilities to trace them. We identify individuals 
who are likely to be receivers of disability care from the fact that they received an individual 
subsidy for disabled persons. We then allocate total public disability care costs evenly across 
these individuals. 
Schooling and child care: The allocation of public costs of schooling and child care follows 
a similar procedure to that for hospital and elderly care costs. Average costs by age interval 
are provided by the Swedish Association of Municipalities and Regions (2007). Possibly 
these costs underestimate the schooling costs for refugee children, since these children often 
suffer from previous traumatic experiences and may thus require extra support. There is no 
data that helps us to estimate the magnitude of this difference. Yet it appears reasonable to 
assume that refugees’ age-adjusted schooling cost markup is lower than their age-adjusted 
hospital care cost markup. Hence we multiply refugees’ schooling costs by a factor 1.1, which 
is lower than the factor 1.3 that was applied to hospital care costs. 
Crime and justice: Total public costs relating to crime and justice are obtained from the 
Swedish Government (2007). According to Martens and Holmberg (2005), individuals who 
were born outside Sweden are 2.5 times as likely to be suspected of criminality as people who 
were born in Sweden by two Swedish-born parents. This distinction only partly corresponds 
to the one that we are interested in. All immigrants’ criminality may underestimate refugees’ 
criminality. At the same time, the criminality of people born in Sweden of two Swedish-born 
parents will underestimate the criminality of the total population in Sweden. Having no 
further information about which underestimation may be worse than the other, we apply the 
factor 2.5 also as a measure of the degree of criminality among refugees compared with that 
in the total population. 
Language training for immigrants: This cost item is explicitly for immigrants. It is the sum 
of education in Swedish and in the mother’s tongue. According to Ekberg (2009), these costs 
were in total approximately 1.5 billion kronor in 2006. We apply this figure also to 2007, and 
ascribe half of it to refugees and half to other immigrants (according to our estimates, 
approximately 40% of all immigrants present in 2007 were refugees). 
Integration policy: This is another cost item that explicitly targets immigrants. As for 
language training, we allocate half of total costs to refugees and half to other immigrants. 
Labor market policy: Ekberg (2009) allocates labor market policy spending between 
immigrants and natives under the assumption that per-capita spending is twice as high for 
immigrants as for natives. We allocate spending between refugees and the rest of the 
population by assuming that the same factor holds between these two groups. 
Other: The category “Other” encompasses one-third of all public sector costs. To some 
extent this category contains spending that was in fact targeted at specific individuals, yet we 
lack the information to trace it. Yet to a large extent it consists of spending on public goods 
such as infrastructure, defense, and central administration. It also includes the large public 
sector surplus in 2007. Not all studies in the literature include the surplus on the cost side in 
this way, yet we follow the recommendation of Rowthorn (2008) to do so. 
4.2 – Results  
Refugees’ estimated contributions to fiscal revenues and costs are reported in column (2) of 
Table 4. Column (3) reports refugees’ share of the total amount for each item. A value in 
column (3) that is higher than 5.1% (i.e. refugees’ share of the total population) means that 
refugees are over-represented, and a value lower than that means that they are under-
represented. 
On the public revenue side refugees are clearly under-represented. We estimate that only 
3.4% of total revenues are from refugees. On the other hand, refugees are over-represented as 
receivers of public transfers and public consumption. The most striking case is that of social 
assistance, where the refugee population receives a full 55% of total spending. Still, social 
assistance is a relatively small budget item. Hence the total value of refugees’ over-
representation as receivers of social assistance is for example more than balanced by that of 
their under-representation as public pension receivers.  
We saw in Table 2 that refugees are to a higher extent in the 20-59 years-of-age interval. This 
is reflected by their lower-than-average costs of hospital and elderly care, as well as of 
schooling and child care. 
On the final row of Table 4 we find the estimate of the total amount of resources that are 
redistributed to refugees through the public sector in 2007: 32.5 billion kronor. This is quite 
exactly equal to 1% of Swedish GDP in that year (or exactly 0.99%). Four-fifths of this deficit 
is created by lower public per-capita revenues from refugees, and one-fifth is created by 
higher public per-capita costs. Total public revenues from refugees are 26.0 billion kronor less 
than they would have been if per-capita revenues from refugees had been the same as those 
from the total population. Yet public costs associated with refugees are only 6.5 billion kronor 
more than they would have been if also these per-capita levels were similar. If we divide the 
total redistribution by the total number of refugees, we find that the redistribution to the 
average refugee amounts to approximately 70,000 kronor. This number is in turn equal to 
44% of the public sector’s per capita revenues in 2007. 
5 – Discussion  
The calculations that have been reported in this article show that the Swedish public sector in 
2007 redistributed an amount equal to 1.0% of GDP from the rest of the population to the 
refugee population. Scaling that number up by the subsequent increase in the refugee 
population, the corresponding redistribution in 2015 is estimated at around 1.35% of GDP. 
This value thus represents the net annual cost today of having had Europe’s apparently 
highest per-capita rate of refugee immigration for a full thirty years. As such, it also gives an 
indication of what the cost would be of higher refugee immigration in the rest of Europe. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the EU15 would have hosted an additional five million 
refugees today if it had matched the Swedish per capita refugee immigration rate since 2005.  
This study adds to the literature that estimates fiscal redistribution from natives to immigrants 
in various high-income countries, yet it is unique in its specific focus on refugee immigrants. 
In this literature in general, the main sources of error are expected to be decreasing marginal 
public costs of an increasing population, and crowding-out effects on the labor market. The 
first of these would lead us to over-estimate the public cost of immigration, and the second to 
under-estimate it. Decreasing public costs refer to the idea that if the population increases by 
1% due to immigration, not all public costs increase in proportion. Defense and infrastructure 
are often cited as plausible candidates where this may be the case. Crowding-out effects on 
the other hand would imply that in the absence of immigrants, natives’ earnings and tax 
payments would have been higher, as they would have faced less labor market competition. 
Between these two sources of error, decreasing marginal costs is most often treated in the 
literature as being the largest source of error. Several studies (e.g. Lee and Miller, 1998; 
Dustmann and Frattini, 2014) report estimates where part of public spending is not assumed to 
be affected by immigration. Rowthorn (2008) argues that the literature pays too little attention 
to the possible importance of a negative labor market impact of immigration. Yet in the 
present case where we consider refugees, this factor is likely to be less important than for 
immigration in general. This is because the average refugee takes several years to enter the 
labor market (see Ekberg and Hammarstedt, 2002, for this result in the Swedish case). Hence 
it appears more likely that the calculations in this study over-estimate than under-estimate the 
public cost of refugee immigration. 
The results reported also show that the net redistribution to the refugee population is to about 
80% due to lower per-capita revenues from refugees, and only to about 20% due to higher 
per-capita spending. The lower public revenues from refugees are in turn a direct effect of low 
employment rates; the employment rate among adult refugees was found to be a full twenty 
percentage points lower than that among all adults. Hence in shaping policies to reduce the 
net redistribution to the present refugee population, it appears wise to focus on policies that 
aim at increasing refugees’ employment rates. 
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Tables  
Table 1. Origins of refugee population 
   Share (%) of  
 
 
Origin 
 
Years of 
immigration 
total sample sample 
immigrated 
1980-2006 
all asylum 
grants 
 1980-2006 
Afghanistan 1980-2006 2.8 3.0 2.3 
Chile 1973-1990 5.8 4.7 5.2 
Cuba All 0.5 0.6 0.3 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 1974-2006 4.7 4.8 4.5 
Hungary 1950-1989 2.8 0.8 – 
Iran All 15.8 16.0 17.0 
Iraq All 23.5 24.6 21.0 
Lebanon 1975-1991 3.9 3.7 2.3 
Liberia 1989-2005 0.1 0.1 – 
Romania 1950-1989 1.7 1.6 1.5 
Sierra Leone 1992-2003 0.1 0.1 – 
Somalia All 5.2 5.4 5.4 
Sudan All 0.3 0.3 – 
Vietnam All 2.7 2.8 3.2 
Yugoslavia (former) 1993-2006 30.1 31.6 37.4 
Notes: Number of individuals in total sample: 79,724. Number of individuals immigrated 1980-2006: 75,855. 
Shares of all asylum grants in 1980-2006 (fifth column) refer to all grants to the relevant countries and periods. 
Countries with a dash in this column are not separately listed in the aggregate asylum grants data. 
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Refugees Total population 
Male 52.3% 49.7% 
Age   
0-19 13.1% 26.1% 
20-39 42.2% 24.2% 
40-59 34.8% 25.5% 
60-79 8.8% 18.5% 
80+ 1.2% 5.7% 
Years since immigration   
1-4 16.9%  
5-9 18.4%  
10-14 30.4%  
15-19 17.2%  
20-24 9.4%  
25+ 7.7%  
Education (ages 25-64)   
Not completed lower secondary 13.8% 5.3% 
Exactly lower secondary 10.0% 10.3% 
Some upper secondary 42.3% 46.8% 
Some tertiary 30.4% 35.8% 
Unknown 3.5% 1.9% 
Economic status (ages 18-64)   
Median annual non-capital income 142,071 233,024 
Share non-capital income > 9,000 kronor/month   
All individuals 56.5% 78.5% 
Males only 61.0% 80.0% 
Share receiving social assistance 17.0% 3.3% 
Notes: Non-capital income is mainly salary income, small business income, and pensions 
 
  
Table 3. Share of refugee population aged 18-64 receiving social assistance by origin 
 Share (%) 
 
 
Origin 
(1) 
Raw data 
(2) 
(1) + control age 
& years since 
immigration 
(3) 
(1) + control 
education (ages 
25-64) 
Former Yugoslavia 11.9 +0.5 –1.6 
Iraq 29.3 +13.4 +12.0 
Iran 10.2 +3.8 +3.9 
Somalia 40.2 +25.0 +20.3 
Latin America 6.4 +4.3 +2.9 
Eastern Europe 3.2 – – 
Other Asia 18.3 +10.5 +7.0 
Other Africa 14.3 +5.9 +3.1 
Min-max range 37.0 25.0 21.9 
Obs 66,503 66,503 55,392 
Notes: Column (1) reports the shares of refugee immigrants who receive social assistance by region of origin. 
Columns (2)-(3) report the residual probabilities of being a social assistance receiver by origin, after controlling 
for combinations of age, years since immigration, and education. 
 
  
Table 4. Redistribution to refugees through the public sector year 2007  
 (1) 
Total 
population 
(billion kronor) 
(2) 
Refugees 
(billion kronor) 
(3) 
Refugees share 
of total value 
(%) 
Public revenues 1473.3 49.4 3.4 
Direct taxes, individuals 536.8 16.2 3.0 
Payroll taxes 391.5 15.3 3.9 
Consumption taxes 398.6 15.9 4.0 
Direct taxes, corporations 106.6 0 0 
Other 39.8 2.0 5.1 
    
Public costs 1473.3 81.9 5.6 
Social assistance 7.8 4.3 55.4 
Pensions 286.7 3.3 1.2 
Other individual transfers 195.4 18.8 9.6 
Hospital and elderly care 240.6 9.1 3.8 
Disability care 37.2 2.1 5.7 
Schooling and child care 158.0 4.9 3.1 
Crime and justice 30.6 7.7 25.3 
Language training for immigrants 1.5 0.8 50 
Integration policy 4.1 2.1 50 
Labor market policy 16.7 3.5 20.7 
Other 494.8 25.3 5.1 
    
Net result 0 –32.5  
 
 
 
  
Figures 
Figure 1. Shares of refugees receiving social assistance, by years since immigration 
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